However the situation of French was far from brilliant. The inexplicable times of halt provided by the operations of Bubna that he personally directed, had exercised counter strokes against those of the General Zechmeister.
The first days of February would, like the last days of January, also pass quite slowly. Major Saint-Quentin arrived in Saint-Marcel, crossed onto the right bank when the bridge was restored.
Two platoons of Liechtenstein Hussars sent in reconnaissance on La Tour-du-Pin, had fallen into a squadron of French gendarmes who pursued them without maintaining their order. The lieutenant of hussars, seeing this error, whirled about when the gendarmes least expected it, overthrew those who were near his hussars, took from them a few men and forced the rest of the squadron to withdraw in haste.
The advantage gained by the French cavalry, however, was very insignificant. The Austrian outposts there had been pulled back from Montluel on Meximieux; but the French cavalry, without being supported, had not dared to attack this position and was withdrawn in the evening to return to its cantonments of Miribel, when the Austrian vanguard reappeared and reestablished its outposts. The inaction of Bubna was even less justified as the advanced guard troops from Catalonia, he well knew, had not yet arrived in Nimes.
Informed as he was, he wasn't ignorant that some newly formed battalions, which joined Augereau were without arms, others poorly armed; the men of these battalions were barely dressed and incompletely equipped without haversacks, without pouches, untrained; that Augereau lacked money and the magazines of the French army were empty. He should also have been interested in preventing the people from arming themselves and rising, and he felt this so strongly, that in the proposal that in the occupation of Chalon by Scheither, he insisted particularly on this point.
