This memorandum concludes that, apart from any measures involving military operations deep into North VietNam, the proposed actions do not present legal problems incapable of being dealt with and surmounted. The memorandum suggests some changes that ought to be made in the planning for these actions if it is decided to proceed with the general course plotted out by the Taylor Mission.
These changes would be designed to improve the defensibility of our actions and to avoid consequences that would be prejudicial to the interests of South Viet-Nam and the United States. There is also Tab B 4 a suggested revision of certain paragraphs of the draft letter from President Diem. Thus, apart from the possibility of long-range attacks into North VietNam, the issues in deciding on our future course of action are essentially political.
But we must remember that the extent to which resort to direct self-help, rather than to the procedures and institutions for peaceful settlement of international problems, has an important bearing on the prospects and effectiveness of the rule of law in the world. Because of my deep concern with these matters, I should like to give you my thoughts on the less technically legal issues in relation to VietNam.
But the remedies proposed would undertake to cope with the situation principally by military and semi-military means. The central feature of the course would be the initial introduction of substantial numbers of United States troops to help in pacifying the country.
It is said that to embark on this course we must be prepared to escalate, if necessary, to the dimensions of a Korea-type conflict. In assessing the prospects for this course the long history of attempts to prop up unpopular governments through the use of foreign military forces is powerfully discouraging.
